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ARTHUR H. CHAN*
To Market or Not to Market:
Allocating Water Rights
in New Mexico
ABSTRACT
Recent Supreme Court decisions have declared groundwater to be
an article of interstate commerce and have made its efficient con-
servation imperative for retaining a state's rights over it. Market
allocation of water has been suggested as a means of achieving the
required efficiency. However, while a competitive market may be an
efficient allocative mechanism, it is not an efficient allocative insti-
tution due to the presence of redundancy and the threat of infra-
structure dislocation. In addition, it is not particularly good or efficient
at achieving community goals such as ecological preservation, spe-
cies protection, or welfare promotion for future generations. This
article explores these concepts in the context of water rights litigation
in New Mexico.
THE LEGAL SETTING
With a statewide annual average of only 13 inches of precipitation,'
water is precious in semiarid New Mexico. Recognizing the importance
of this resource to the livelihood of the inhabitants in the area, the supply
and use of water has been regulated since the days of prehistoric Indians.
"Long before other states began thinking about protecting their water,
New Mexico was passing water laws. The state also can be proud of the
administration of those laws." 2
Traditional patterns of state control and management of water resources
were disrupted in 1982 when the United States Supreme Court handed
down a landmark decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas' which
resulted in substantial diminution of state control over its water.4 The
significance of Sporhase stems initially from it being "a pioneering, first
*Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM
88003.
1. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Dep't of the Interior, New Mexico Water Resources Assessment
for Planning Purposes 10 (1976).
2. L. Harris, New Mexico Water Rights I (New Mexico Water Resources Research Institute
Miscellaneous Report No. 15, 1984).
3. 458 U.S. 941 (1982); Gross, Commerce Clause Curbs State Control of Interstate Use of Ground
Water: City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 24 Nat. Res. J. 218-20 (1984).
4. Bird, Implications of Sporhase in Water-Resource Planning, 112 J. Water Res. Plan. & Mgmt.
202 (1986).
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attempt of the court to grapple with interstate groundwater disputes." 5
More important, the court in Sporhase extends commerce clause prin-
ciples to groundwater transfers,6 declaring that groundwater is an article
of commerce, to be traded in interstate commerce.7 In so doing, the court
departs from the prior doctrine of equitable apportionment which governs
the allocation of interstate surface flows.' Such departure creates a good
deal of confusion and uncertainty for planning and management. Scientific
evidence has shown that surface water and groundwater commonly belong
to a hydrogeologically integrated system. The Supreme Court, on the
other hand, seems to be distinguishing between surface water and ground-
water and treating them differently by applying different legal doctrines.9
Insofar as New Mexico is concerned, the more immediate impacts of
Sporhase came when the federal district court of New Mexico applied
the commerce clause ruling to City of El Paso v. Reynolds"° and struck
down the New Mexico statute banning groundwater exportation. " Given
that El Paso has filed applications to drill as many as 326 wells in the
Hueco and Mesilla Bolsons in southern New Mexico to appropriate up
to 296,000 acre-feet of groundwater per year,' 2 policymakers and planners
are justifiably concerned about sizable appropriations by out-of-state ap-
propriators that might deplete its groundwater resources. In addition, New
Mexico must be concerned about preserving its surface water rights. It
was made clear in yet another Supreme Court decision, allocating water
in the Vermejo River between New Mexico and Colorado, that unwasteful
5. Utton, In Search of an Integrating Principle for Interstate Water Law: Regulation versus the
Market Place, 25 Nat. Res. J. 985, 1001 (1985).
6. Water Law Study Committee, The Impact of Recent Court Decisions Concerning Water and
Interstate Commerce on Water Resources of the State of New Mexico, 24 Nat. Res. J. 689, 690
(1984).
7. Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941.
8. Equitable apportionment as a doctrine was originally fashioned by the court in Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), to establish the extent and limits to sharing an interstate stream
between the states,
9. The issue of distinguishing between surface water and groundwater and treating them as separate
systems lies outside the scope of this paper. Suffice it to point out that, in December 1982, less than
half a year after the Sporhase decision, the Supreme Court ruled in Colorado v. New Mexico, 459
U.S. 176 (1982), later proceeding, 463 U.S. 1204, 464 U.S. 927 (1983), dismissed 467 U.S. 310
(1984), that equitable apportionment applied in the sharing of the Vermejo River between Colorado
and New Mexico, thereby reaffirming the doctrine. Colorado received zero share in that decision,
nevertheless.
10. 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983), judgment vacated and remanded, City of El Paso v.
Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. §72-12-19 (repealed 1983).
12. Applications of the City of El Paso, Texas, Public Service Board Nos. LRG-92 through LRG-
357 (September 12, 1980) for the appropriation of 246,000 acre-feet per annum from the Lower
Rio Grande Underground Water Basin and No. HU-12 through HU-71 (September 18, 1980) for
the appropriation of 50,000 acre-feet per annum from the Hueco Underground Water Basin. Sub-
sequent to initial filing, El Paso on November 21, 1986 withdrew 39 applications to appropriate
40,000 acre-feet per annum from the Hueco Underground Water Basin. This resulted in 21 appli-
cations remaining for a total appropriation of 10,000 acre-feet per annum from the Hueco Under-
ground Water Basin. "Findings and Order" by the State Engineer of New Mexico (December 23,
1987), 2, 3-4.
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use of water is extremely important to protecting a state's right to water,
even under the system of equitable apportionment."
Thus New Mexico is in an unenviable position. First, it faces the
prospects of losing the right to large quantities of groundwater to Texas
through appropriation and exportation by El Paso. Second, it must not
become wasteful in its use of the surface water in the Vermejo River lest
the Supreme Court reverse its decision and grant a share of the water to
Colorado. 4 Faced with these prospects, the critical need to conserve water
is forcefully brought to the fore. There are different ways to achieve
conservation, to be sure, but somehow proposals to use a water market
to encourage the "highest and best use"' 5 of water become the dominant
focus.
How the requirement to conserve water gets turned into the proposition
that a water market be used to promote "efficiency" is not entirely clear.
One possible explanation, provided by Julia Vitullo-Martin, is based on
the allegation that a great deal of water is wasted in the Southwest, and
the way to stop such waste is "to introduce the discipline of the mar-
ketplace." 6 However, it is clear that there are a number of uses of water
which, though perhaps not meeting the criterion of "highest and best
use," are nonetheless necessary, recognized, and legitimate.'" Further-
more, these uses generally satisfy the conservation requirement alluded
to above. What is to be done with them? This article will focus on the
issues of whether competitive markets are inherently efficient, whether
they promote efficiency, and whether market allocation of water helps
achieve societal goals. Discussion will be limited to allocations within
the State of New Mexico; issues concerning interstate competition have
been addressed elsewhere.' 8
ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR MARKET ALLOCATION
Market allocation of water means "the distribution of rights which
would result from the operation of a system of free market transfers."'9
Jarret Oeltjen and Loyd Fischer put forth the following rationale to explain
13. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
14. It is instructive to note that the Supreme Court in Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310
(1984), focused on "the issue of whether New Mexico could more efficiently conserve the Vermejo
water supply." McCrossen, Is There a Future for Proposed Water Uses in Equitable Apportionment
Suits?, 25 Nat. Res. J. 791, 806 (1985). For any state to retain its water rights, water must not be
wasted.
15. The "highest and best" use is defined in economic terms, i.e., those uses which provide the
highest monetary return per unit of water used. Oeltjen & Fischer, Allocation of Rights to Water:
Preferences, Priorities, and the Role of the Market, 57 Neb. L. Rev. 245, 247 (1978).
16. Vitullo-Martin, Ending the Southwest's Water Binge, Fortune, Feb. 23, 1981, at 96.
17. For example, instream flow to protect fish and wildlife habitat or to provide recreational
opportunities.
18. See Chan, To Market or Not to Market: Allocation of Interstate Waters, 29 Nat. Res. J. 529
(1989).
19. Oeltjen & Fischer, supra note 15, at 247. See also infra notes 25, 26 and accompanying
text.
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why the market ought to be entrusted to allocate water: "The basic
proposition is that market forces should be permitted to play an expanded
role in the allocation of water rights thus encouraging or at least permitting
efficiency in water use."2
Encouraging efficiency is a very worthwhile objective, but what exactly
does efficiency mean? Tom Tietenberg takes it as maximizing both con-
sumer and producer surpluses.2 He demonstrates this first by specifying
what he calls well-defined property rights.22 Next he posits, "When well-
defined property rights are exchanged, as in a market economy, this
exchange facilitates efficiency. . . .Given a market price, the consumer
decides how much to purchase by choosing that amount which maximizes
his or her individual net benefit." 23 And finally he concludes, "In a system
with well-defined property rights and competitive markets in which to
sell those rights, producers try to maximize their surplus and consumers
try to maximize their surplus. The price system, then, induces those self-
interested parties to make choices which are efficient from the point of
view of society as a whole."'24
One is struck by the great leap of logic from maximizing individual
surpluses to promoting societal efficiency. William Apgar and James Brown
attempt to shed additional light on this issue when they point out that
"an important aspect of efficiency is that the resources used in the pro-
duction process add the most to society's well-being." '25 This outcome is
made possible when "an efficient economy produces the goods most
valued by consumers [and] distributes those goods to the particular con-
sumers who value them most." 26 That means society achieves efficiency
20. Oeltjen & Fischer, supra note 15, at 245.
21. T. Tietenberg, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics 41-43 (1988). Consumer
surplus is the difference between the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay for a specific unit
of a product and its market price. Producer surplus is the difference between the market price and
the minimum price a producer wants to receive before making available to the market an additional
unit of output. For more detailed discussion, see, e.g., D. Hyman, Modem Microeconomics, 165-
71, 317-18 (1988).
22. Well-defined property rights, according to Tietenberg, must meet the following conditions:
1. Universality: all resources are privately owned and all entitlements should be completely
specified.
2. Exclusivity: all benefits and costs accrued as a result of owning and using the resources
should accrue to the owner, and only to the owner, either directly or indirectly by sale to
others.
3. Transferability: all property rights should be transferable from one owner to another in a
voluntary exchange.
4. Enforceability: property rights should be secure from involuntary seizure or encroachment
by others.
T. Tietenberg, supra note 21, at 39.
23. Id. at 41.
24. Id. at 42.
25. W. Apgar & H. Brown, Microeconomics and Public Policy 203 (1987).
26. Id. at 204.
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when resources are used to create the most benefit which in turn is reflected
by the highest value consumers attach to it. Furthermore, goods are made
available to those who pay the highest price for them.
Oeltjen and Fischer put the preceding arguments in the clearest terms
and apply them to the question of water use: "Theoretically, the only
priorities and preferences that a market recognizes are those which reflect
the 'highest and best use' as defined in economic terms. In other words,
that person who can derive the highest net return from a particular use
of a given unit of water will be able to buy and use the water for that
purpose."27 In sum, two principles are at work here: (1) consumer sov-
ereignty holds that individual consumers are the best judges of what will
do them the most good, and (2) willingness-to-pay reflects consumers'
preferences and measures their perception of a good's value.28
SITUATION IN NEW MEXICO
A number of developments in New Mexico seem to have strengthened
the argument in favor of using the market to allocate water rights. An
examination of water availability in the state as well as water use by
category in 1980 and 1985 (the latest figures available) will highlight
some of these developments. On the one hand, "all the state's surface
water and much of its groundwater is appropriated. This situation has
given rise to the current trend of marketing water rights. Most water rights
transactions now involve transfers rather than appropriation of original
rights." 29 On the other hand, as the state's population continues to grow
and the economy continues to develop, more water is required to satisfy
domestic and industrial demands.30
Meanwhile, irrigated agriculture is using the greatest amount of water
in both absolute and percentage terms. Nevertheless, the most recent
trend begins to show an absolute decline in water withdrawal for irrigated
agriculture. 3 Total agricultural use, which includes irrigated agriculture,
livestock, and stockpond evaporation, accounted for 77 percent of total
water withdrawn in 1985, down from 80 percent in 1980.32 These de-
velopments seem to confirm the assertion that "there is a growing trend
of transfers from agricultural use to municipal and industrial use." 33
Furthermore, there is some evidence that such transfers illustrate the
27. Oeltjen & Fischer, supra note 15, at 247.
28. W. Apgar & H. Brown, supra note 25, at 203.
29. Frames, Who's After Your Water Supply? 8 N.M. Bus. J. 90, 93 (1983).
30. B. Wilson, Water Use in New Mexico in 1985, at 8-9 (New Mexico State Engineer Office
Technical Report 46, 1986).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 8.
33. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 1, at 42.
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market at work. "In a number of instances, industry has approached
irrigation farmers and paid them a far more attractive price than they
could have gotten for their crops." 34
Other uses also are placing greater demand on the water supply. Partly
as a result of rising population, personal income, urbanization, and the
amount of leisure time, there is a heightened desire for an opportunity
to hunt and fish. Managers of game and fish are finding ways to enlarge
the supply.35 Additional water supply is indispensable to that effort. 36 At
the same time, growth in recreational water use is expected to proceed
at a phenomenal rate. 37 A Bureau of Reclamation planning document
identifies the future requirements of recreation water use: "The most
urgent need for the future is development of recreational sites near the
urban areas. . . . Water-oriented activities are the most popular forms of
recreation, and interest in these sports is widening. Fishing, boating, and
water skiing require the largest surface areas for outdoor recreation ...
Developments in outdoor vehicles have opened up an entirely new realm
of recreation."
3
Because most water in the state has already been appropriated, addi-
tional supplies to meet these new demands most likely will have to come
from transfers of existing rights. Some have expressed great confidence
that such transfers will proceed smoothly through market allocation. The
same Bureau of Reclamation planning document states: "With regard to
the near future there is little basis for challenging the proposition that
fairly large amounts of water could be released from agricultural use for
industrial, urban, power generation, recreation, and other uses which
would, under current market conditions, yield a greater dollar value per
acre-foot consumed." 39 Others base their optimism on the rate of sub-
stitution. "'If we cut irrigation water use by only. 15 percent,' [New
Mexico State Engineer Steve Reynolds) says, 'we could double the supply
available to municipalities and industries.""
The theme of the preceding argument is that efficient use of water
resources means putting it to the "highest and best use" which is defined
in terms of the monetary value it helps create."' The market mechanism
34. Frames, supra note 29, at 93.
35. Cole, Ward & Ward, Using Systems Analysis for Fishery Management in River Basins, in
Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual New Mexico Water Conference 181 (New Mexico Water
Resources Research Institute Report No. 219, 1987) [hereinafter Proceedings]; U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, supra note I, at 133.
36. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 1, at 135, 141.
37. Id. at 143; see also Findling, Recreation and Water-Pools and Flows, in Proceedings, supra
note 35, at 80.
38. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 1, at 140.
39. Id. at 42.
40. Frames, supra note 29, at 93.
41. See supra notes 19, 25, 26 and accompanying text.
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is said to be perfectly suited to allocate water resources efficiently. In
New Mexico, as in many agricultural states, water should be transferred
from agriculture, where its value is relatively low, to other higher value
uses. At the moment, industrial, residential, and recreational users appear
ready to acquire agricultural water rights. These assertions and their
implications will be evaluated in the next section.
EVALUATING THE COMPETITIVE MARKET
A good deal has been written about the efficiency of the competitive
market as an allocative mechanism."2 Indeed, much of neoclassical mi-
croeconomic theory43 is a theoretical/technical justification of that claim.
Let's accept for the moment the proposition that the competitive market
is in fact an efficient allocative mechanism. The focus of the present
analysis is on evaluating whether the competitive market is an efficient
allocative institution. It will be argued below that the competitive market,
as an institutionalized pattern of behavior, is inherently inefficient for at
least two reasons.
Duplication and Infrastructure Dislocation
First, a competitive market requires the presence of a sufficiently large
number of transaction participants, especially sellers, to ensure the dis-
persion of economic power." Clearly this requirement creates a great
deal of duplication of effort and organization.4" Duplication and redun-
42. See, e.g., Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. 25 .
Fin. 383 (1970); W. Baumol, The Stock Market and Economic Efficiency (1965); Ali, Some Evidence
of the Efficiency of a Speculative Market, 47 Econometrica 387 (1979). The efficient market theory
is predicated on two primary conditions: (1) price reflects all information available to market par-
ticipants, and (2) above-average rate of return cannot be sustained.
43. Neoclassical microeconomic theory is principally a theory of exchange which examines the
behavior of consumers and producers in a market economy. In such an economy, prices play the
crucial rationing role in allocating resources to different uses and in distributing products among
potential buyers. Microeconomic theory, therefore, is also known as price theory. For an explication
of the role of prices in the market economy, see J. Quirk, Intermediate Microeconomics 16-18
(1987).
The theory demonstrates that at market equilibrium, the competitive economy will attain "an
allocation of resources that is so efficient that it is impossible to make one person better off without
hurting [some] other person by any reallocation of resources." R. Ruffin, Modem Price Theory 149
(1988).
44. See. e.g., D. Hyman, supra note 21, at 290. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure
that "no single operating entity is in a position to exploit its superior power to undermine competition
and to gain unjustified advantage." Chan, supra note 18, at 537.
45. While the aim of protection against undermining competition in the market is quite laudable,
there is, unfortunately, no guarantee either in theory or in practice that entry into the market by new
firms will stop once the minimum number of small operating units to ensure competition is in place.
The tendency is just the opposite--too many firms will chase after the lure of profit and begin
production. Eventually, the increased supply will bring the price down and drive many firms into
bankruptcy. This is the so-called industry shakeout one often hears about. It is also prima facie
evidence that too much effort and organization have been devoted to this market initially.
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dancy are not per se inefficient; on the contrary, they are often necessary
and desirable for a functioning system. For example, back-up redundancy
is a critical element in space exploration; without it we risk tragic accidents
such as the space shuttle Challenger disaster. In addition, permitting wider
participation in acceptable social, political, or economic transactions is
always desirable. It is, after all, one of the requisites of a free society.
Nevertheless, duplication and redundancy cannot be justified on the basis
of economic efficiency within the neoclassical context. The validity of
this assertion can be ascertained by observing that duplication and re-
dundancy mean using more inputs than is absolutely necessary to do the
job, and therefore is not technically efficient in production. That in turn
translates into higher cost of production, and higher production cost means
reduced supply which, combined with given demand, ultimately results
in higher price, smaller output, and diminished efficiency in terms of
consumer and producer surpluses.'
Meanwhile, the profit motive is supposed to be the driving force which
makes the market work in a capitalistic system. However, nowhere in
the system is there a device which will promptly send out a signal when
sufficient output or capacity is in place. Some would argue, by pointing
to the efficient market theory, that price is just such a device designed to
transmit information to market participants regarding consumer wants and
producer capacity.47 But consider the cobweb model, which is frequently
used to demonstrate the equilibrating process of price adjustment in a
competitive market. It shows price fluctuating from above-equilibrium to
below-equilibrium level in successive periods that, under proper market
conditions, will gradually move toward the market-clearing price. At the
same time,. output correspondingly changes from surplus to shortage in
successive periods until finally arriving at the equilibrium quantity.4 How
long each period is depends on the product in question. And of course,
the longer it takes to clear the market, the lower the efficiency of the
market. Another problem could also surface-that the market may never
be able to settle in an equilibrium due to frequent or even continuous
changes. As a result, the system is plagued by chronic shortages or
surpluses in the short-run and under- or over-capacity in the long-run.
Neither situation can remotely be considered efficient.49
46. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
47. See discussion supra note 42. Financial markets are frequently held up by efficient market
theorists as shining examples of efficient markets. See sources cited supra note 42. However, the
1987 stock market crash caught them by surprise and left them completely perplexed as to why
stock prices could fluctuate so wildly. See Donnelly, Efficient-Market Theorists Are Puzzled by Recent
Gyrations in Stock Market, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1987, at 8, cols. 1-2.
48. See, e.g., W. Nicholson, Intermediate Microeconomics and Its Application 318-21 (1987).
49. Some might object to the use of the competitive market and the cobweb model to analyze
the operation of water markets in the West as these markets are far from competitive. But their use
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Assume for the moment that over-capacity exists. Conventional wis-
dom holds that it cannot persist for long in a competitive environment.
Price falls when quantity supplied exceeds quantity demanded. So an
inevitable shakeout eventually will take place-witness the ongoing de-
velopments in the airlines and personal computer industries-leading to
dislocation and wastes. High technology production serves a particularly
useful example here. It typically requires specialized inputs, including
physical capital and labor. Specialized machines and personnel are gen-
erally not very useful to anything except that for which they are designed
or trained. After a shakeout, unneeded resources routinely sit idle, but
idle resources are costly. Unused or underutilized capital imposes a cost
on society in diminished output, not to mention opportunity cost.'
The same can be said of the workers as well. Take, for instance, the
oversupply of dentists and physicians in several specialties." These well-
trained professionals are not functioning at their potential. Their initial
training costs are by no means low. Now faced with unemployment or
underemployment, the affected individuals and society at large must bear
the additional financial, psychic, and social costs. There is, for example,
ample evidence linking unemployment to higher levels of emotional stress,
which in turn lead to higher incidence of physical ailment.2 And one will
be hard pressed to ignore or even deny the real contribution of unem-
ployment to crime and other anti-social behavior.
All these costs ought to be included in the overall calculus which
determines the efficiency of market allocation. Nevertheless, invariably
they are not. Had they been included as they should, it would have been
extremely difficult to demonstrate that the competitive market is an ef-
ficient allocative institution.
Consider the following scenario. When a family is driven off the farm
and into the city, not only is dislocation of persons and skills created but
dislocation of infrastructure as well. The entire system of streets and
bridges, schools and hospitals, utilities and public safety of the community
here is intended only to show that even the competitive market, generally accepted as the most
efficient among all market structures, is actually a rather inefficient allocative institution. If the real
world condition of non-competitive markets are used in the analysis, that inefficiency will simply
become even more glaring.
50. Opportunity cost is the cost concept used in economics. It is defined as the value of benefit
foregone for choosing a particular course of action. Here, the opportunity cost of unused or under-
utilized capital previously devoted to some high technology production, but now sitting idle, is the
benefit to society that capital could have produced had it been put to some other productive use. Of
course that benefit is currently lost when -the capital is either not working or not working at its
potential.
51. See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of Health Manpower, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Physician Manpower Requirements (1978).
52. See, e.g., D. Glass, Behavior Patterns, Stress, and Coronary Disease (1977); Kobasa, The
Hardy Personality: Toward a Social Psychology of Stress and Health, in Social Psychology of Health
and Illness 3 (G. Sanders & J. Suls eds. 1982).
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from which the family departs overnight becomes just a little bit too big
to be efficient. Upon arrival in a new community, this family begins using
the same services, but the facilities of its new abode are just a little bit
too small to accommodate its needs efficiently. Consequently, there is
waste in one place, congestion in another, and inefficiency everywhere."
As the push for water rights transfers from agriculture to other uses
continues, more and more people will have to leave their farms and enter
the cities. The costs associated with misplaced infrastructure will quickly
mount. These costs are real and economists need to account for them.
Indeed, it has been suggested that public transfer payments be made to
farmers to keep them on the farm in an effort to prevent infrastructure
dislocation from becoming a reality and perhaps to enable society to
accrue some cost saving. 4
Community Goals
That the competitive market is an inefficient allocative institution is
not sufficient to conclude prima facie that it is not very useful in helping
to achieve broad societal goals. Tietenberg has asserted that self-interest
will prompt individuals operating in a price system "to make choices
which are efficient from the point of view of society as a whole. "" Implicit
in this is an identity of interest between private aims and community
goals-that what is good for the average citizen or a business enterprise
is also good for the country. Such an assertion demands careful consid-
eration.
At issue is the distinction between private preferences and social values.' 6
Is the market equally capable of satisfying private preferences as it is of
promoting social values? George Lodge thinks not. He explains, "The
old belief was that the uses of property are best controlled through com-
petition among individual proprietors, each seeking maximum gain by
bidding to satisfy individual desires in an open market place. This has
become increasingly irrelevant to important segments of the American
economy. In its place arises the notion that community need is in many
instances clear and distinct from consumer desire and that it is this need
. . . that must be the arbiter of property use.'
53. The author wishes to thank Professor Bert Evans for sharing this illustration and his insight.
54. Id.
55. T. Tietenberg, supra note 21, at 42.
56. For an excellent exposition of the debate, see Sagoff, Values and Preferences, 96 Ethics 301
(1986).
57. G. Lodge, The New American Ideology 235 (1975). The U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld
a Pennsylvania law empowering the state to require coal companies to leave enough coal in the
ground to avoid damaging buildings above. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 480
U.S. 470 (1987). Justice John Stevens wrote for the majority: "Under our system of government,
one of the state's primary ways of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals can
make of their property." Id. at 491.
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Still, allocation and production according to the dictates of the market
admittedly will supply the society with an abundance of privately de-
manded products. It is in guiding allocation and production to meet
community needs that it falls short of the mark. Lodge illustrates, "The
fact that consumers in the 1960s were not eager to buy either safer or
less polluting cars did not mean the community did not need them." 58
The market simply fails to register that need. Hence society suffers from
a poverty of goods and services which are both desirable and necessary.
John Kenneth Galbraith calls this phenomenon "social imbalance," the
image of which is conveyed by the following example.
The family which takes its ... air conditioned, power-steered, and
power-braked automobile out for a tour passes through cities that are
badly paved, made hideous by litter, blighted buildings, billboards,
and posts for wires that should long since have been put underground.
They pass on into a countryside that has been rendered largely in-
visible by commercial art .... They picnic on exquisitely packaged
food from a portable icebox by a polluted stream and go on to spend
the night at a park which is a menace to public health and morals.
Just before dozing off on an air mattress, beneath a nylon tent, amid
the stench of decaying refuse, they may reflect vaguely on the curious
unevenness of their blessings.59
That there is a significant difference between private aims and com-
munity goals in terms of motivation and ethical foundation is clear. In-
dividual decisions geared toward private benefit often are contrary to
social welfare. When the price is right, many people conceivably would
not think twice about clear-cutting a forest, exhausting an aquifer, or
using the environment as a dumping ground, if all they ever care about
is the monetary gain going into their pockets. Fortunately, people gen-
erally are not that single minded.
"Our obsolete market mentality" often blinds us to what actually sus-
tains us, what makes us human. 6 Consider the statement by University
of Arizona economist William Martin that "there is no reason to avoid
mining water any more than we avoid mining coal, or copper, or any
depletable resource. Economically, resources do us no good just lodging
in the ground."' This statement shows a complete lack of moral re-
sponsibility to anyone and anything that is not human or living in the
present generation. "Resources" are viewed merely as the stuff which
enables humans to satisfy their desires. Since the goal is to maximize
that satisfaction,62 it follows that humans should use as much resources
58. G. Lodge, supra note 57, at 237.
59. J. Galbraith, The Affluent Society 253 (1958).
60. Polanyi, Our Obsolete Market Mentality, 3 Commentary 109, 115-16 (1947).
61. Quoted in Vitullo-Martin, supra note 6, at 100.
62. The most basic assumption of consumption theory in economics is that consumers maximize
their satisfaction. D. Hyman, supra note 21, at 13.
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as possible. If it entails mining and exhausting a depletable resource,
there is no reason not to do so.
As for future generations, they would have to fend for themselves.
They could perhaps ask the competitive market for help. Meanwhile, the
present generation is going to enjoy life. Human action in the areas of
species extinction and toxic/hazardous materials, to name only two, is
indicative of the disregard for the welfare of future generations.
Furthermore, what about the integrity of nature apart from humans?
The book of Genesis directs humans on earth to "be fruitful, and multiply,
and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish
of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that
moveth upon the earth." 63 Thus, for those who accept the Bible as the
word of God, as have many influential thinkers and politicians in Western
Civilization, humans are given a sort of license by God not only to use
but to dominate nature. That may be why Martin is able to proclaim that
"resources do us no good just lodging in the ground." Resources cannot
be exploited so long as they remain underground.
If nature is not to be exploited, how can it be protected? Because of
the market-oriented notion that nature is a resource, fictitious though it
may be,' to be traded on a free, open market, humans can protect nature
if they so choose by paying the proper price.65 The Audubon Society or
Nature Conservancy, for example, can purchase a tract of land where a
critical wildlife habitat or an exceptional wilderness is located, set it
aside, and protect it. This may have the appearance of emancipating
nature, but nature is not free from bondage in that its freedom and pro-
tection extend only to the boundaries of the preserve. Alternatively, nature
itself can enter the market and buy its own freedom. Of course this
suggestion is absurd, but that is the logical outcome when market allo-
cation is extended into spheres which properly ought to be restricted.'
Some have suggested that humanity rethink its relationship to nature.67
"Our experience has taught us the lesson that the environment is actually
a complex ecological system with humankind being an integral part of
it. . . . Given the multitude of interdependences, it is in the interest of
the community as a whole as well as its constituent members that each
member be 'entitled to continuance.' ,68
63. Genesis 1:28.
64. See Polanyi, supra note 60, at 110-11.
65. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
66. See Polanyi, supra note 60, at 113-15.
67. See, e.g.. H. Sprout & M. Sprout, Multiple Vulnerabilities: The Context of Environmental
Repair and Protection 18-19 (1974); A. Leopold, A Sand County Almanac 247 (1970).
68. A. Chan, The Evolutionary Concept of Property Rights in Natural Resources Management
3 (paper presented at the Southwestern Economics Association Meetings, Dallas, TX, Mar. 19-21,
1987).
[Vol. 29
Summer 1989] ALLOCATING WATER RIGHTS IN NEW MEXICO
This suggestion stems from a dissatisfaction with the way the issue
traditionally has been framed. Laurence Tribe warns of a trap when
environmental protection and resource management are undertaken for
the long term potential of nature's contribution to human welfare rather
than for the protection of nature for its own sake.' Furthermore, Aldo
Leopold aptly clarifies, "[A] system of conservation based solely on
economic self-interest is hopelessly lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus
eventually to eliminate, many elements in the land community that lack
commercial value, but that are ... essential to its healthy functioning."7
This conceptual pitfall can be avoided by reframing the issue and redi-
recting the debate. As a first step, nature needs to be acknowledged,
accepted, and accordingly treated by humans as a fellow member of the
biotic community. "Respecting natural objects as fellow members of the
biotic community frees us from the disingenuous pretense we feel obliged
to manufacture in order to justify their continued existence.""' To truly
treat nature with respect, humanity must accept its moral responsibilities
to nature and develop Leopold's "land ethic"-an ethic dealing with
humans' cooperative relation to soils, waters, plants, and animals.72
The values which motivate humans to preserve resources, to be con-
cerned about future generations, and to protect nature are in the main
ethical, not self-interested. The goals in these regards reflect humanity's
beliefs of what a good community should be. That is why it is disturbing
when recreationists and tourist trade operators in New Mexico join the
chorus in arguing for accelerated water rights transfers, presumably from
agricultural use.73 Many recreationists view themselves as environmen-
talists and consider instream flow vital to protecting fish and wildlife
habitat, but their arguments have been couched in terms of market al-
location,74 believing that recreational use can compete successfully in the
marketplace.75
Clearly this thinking is founded foremost on human benefit and private
desire. But it is equally clear that ecological integrity for a private water
user can never be competitive in the marketplace. Nor should nature be
made a competitor, for doing so would mean being ensnared by the trap
discussed previously. More important, it is imperative to make sure that
recreational activities are consistent with or conducive to environmental
preservation. This consideration is particularly crucial in the fragile desert
69. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees, in When Values Conflict 69 (1976).
70. A. Leopold, supra note 67, at 251.
71. A. Chan, supra note 68, at 3-4.
72. A. Leopold, supra note 67, at 237-39.
73. See, e.g., Findling, supra note 37, at 84.
74. See, e.g., Cole, Ward & Ward, supra note 35.
75. Findling, supra note 37, at 85.
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environment.76 To put this more fundamentally: Can recreation promote
environmental and aesthetic values? This is not at all clear---certainly not
in all instances."
Additionally, is nature to be sacrificed along with the farmers? After
the marginal farmers have been eliminated from participation in the mar-
ket, the remaining farmers are much more proficient in generating mon-
etary value. Already unable to compete successfully against marginal
farmers, nature's chances of survival in a much more fiercely competitive
marketplace are slim indeed. After most of the farm sector is gone, and
perhaps the environment as well, can recreation and tourism continue to
compete successfully against remaining uses? Can recreation and tourism
survive as an industry without a healthy environment?78 And ultimately,
is a dangerous precedent not being created when market exchange is
extended beyond its proper sphere, an exchange that could lead to very
serious adverse consequences? 79
All these issues are important. Their analysis is complex, and their
final answers are not altogether clear. What is certain is that it is not as
simple as the prescription of the neoclassical ilk-namely, let the market
decide.
CHALLENGE TO OUR WISDOM
The present situation in New Mexico makes it imperative that we wisely
manage our water resources and diligently conserve their supplies. There
is strong impetus, both nationally and within the state, to assign the
primary responsibility for allocating water resources to the market in the
name of greater economic efficiency. The arguments presented in this
article try to make clear that while the market may be an efficient allocative
mechanism, it is hardly an efficient allocative institution.
In addition, treating nature-and its components: land, water, and air-
as a resource, to be traded on the market and used to satisfy human
desires, raises very serious ethical questions. Issues involving social val-
ues are public in nature. They must be discussed in public terms."0 Their
analysis ultimately derives from the idea of what a good community is.
76. For a discussion of the destructiveness of human activity to the desert ecology, see Lopez,
California Desert, A Worldly Wilderness, 171 National Geographic 42, 66-68 (1987).
77. Some examples of recreational activities that do not promote environmental and aesthetic
values are: operating off-road vehicles, including mountain bicycles that carve deep scars in valley
floors and mountain sides; snowmobiling, the roar of which breaks the silence and solitude of a
winter forest; the increasingly popular organized cruises to watch whales, which place great stress
on the animals; and disturbances to birds, fish, and fishermen by motor boating and water skiing.
78. See a negative response in Wallin, Rio Grande Management: The View from Upstream,
Proceedings, supra note 35, at 102.
79. See Polanyi, supra note 60, at 115-17.
80. Sagoff, supra note 56, at 316.
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The first step is to define the goals of a good community. Suffice it to
point out that ensuring the continued existence of members of the biotic
community and safeguarding the integrity of the environment have been
embraced explicitly as community goals.8
The next step is to devise ways to achieve those goals. The competitive
market, although quite good at satisfying individual desires and prefer-
ences, is not particularly adept in achieving community goals. Mark
Sagoff is compelling in pointing to the transcendence of community goals
over the market when he says,
They are goals we determine for ourselves as a community, goals
we could not conceive, much less achieve, as individuals trading in
markets. A community is not an aggregate of individuals or a set of
preferences to be satisfied; people in communities know purposes
and aspirations together they could not know alone .... The goals
a society may choose should be consistent with a sense of decency
and compassion for which there is no analytical or methodological
substitute. They will also depend on the place of that society in the
historical progress of humankind and on the lessons it has learned
from experience.82
Our action today will be judged by our descendants in the future. It is
hoped that we have enough wisdom to be decent and compassionate.
81. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982 & Supp. 1987)); National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 (1982 &
Supp. 1986)).
82. Sagoff, supra note 56, at 315.
